Well, here's how I heard the story of Bagley and the coal.
I have a model railroading buddy whose grandfather was an engineer on the CP in Maine. One day my friend showed me a family heirloom, a piece of railroad paperwork from the CP listing all the trains that ran on some particular day, with their engineers and conductors. He pointed out one name--"That's my grandfather, there", and then he moved his finger down and said "And that guy, a few years later, caused the worst railroad accident in the history of Maine..." and it was Bagley, and my friend told the story at that point. Now, that was a few years ago, and my memory isn't perfect, and how much had oral history changed the truth before I heard it?
Here's what I found by Internet searching:
The accident really happened, but later than I said: it was December 20, 1919, and the passenger extras were from St John, not Halifax. Bagley really was the eastbound freight engineer, and there was a question of how many westbound trains were running, and where they were, but it was more complicated than just counting trains past a particular point.
Here's a report from the New York Times the next day:
http://www3.gendisasters.com/maine/5891/onawa-me-train-wreck-dec-1919
But here's the complete report on the accident, from a site titled "Train Order Accidents; A review of 68 accidents under the American system of time table and train orders from ICC reports, 1911-1966". It's at
http://mysite.du.edu/~jcalvert/railway/trainord.htm . No mention of coal, however, so maybe that part is indeed "urban legend".
The Canadian Pacific has a direct line from Montral to New Brunswick that passes through Maine just north of the settled areas, from Megantic, Que. to Adams Junction, N.B., which was part of the Atlantic Division. The Moosehead Subdivision extended from Megantic to Brownville Junction, 117 miles, forming the western half of this line. In 1919, this line was operated by time table and train orders, with dispatching by telephone, except for electric train staff blocks near the termini: Megantic to Boundary, 15.2 miles, and Barnard to Brownville Junction, 8.5 miles. Traffic was quite heavy, about 41 trains per day.
... On the morning of 20 December 1919, first class passenger train No. 39 was moving west in four sections. Third 39 carried steerage passengers from the liner Empress of France that had been landed at St. John, and were bound for Montreal. Engine 783 had 11 cars: a wooden boxcar baggage, a coach, two colonist cars, two tourist sleepers, one colonist car, one cafe car, one tourist sleeper and two cabooses. At Brownville Junction it received three Form 31 orders, numbers 20, 28 and 38. Order No. 20 stated: "First No 39 eng 818 late Second No 39 eng 852 on block Third No 39 eng unknown run four 4 hours and twenty 20 minutes late Barnard to Boundary." Order No. 28 was: "Order No 20 is annulled. First No 39 eng 818 late Second No 39 eng 852 on block Third No 39 eng unknown run five 5 hours late Barnard to Boundary." Finally, order No. 38 said: "Engine 783 display signals and run as Third No 39 Brownville to Megantic."
In these orders, each section was mentioned, with the comments "late" or "on block," which was not common practice, but apparently was required by the dispatching manual of the Atlantic Division. Adding this information was not part of the Standard Code. Third No. 39 departed Brownville Junction at 6.25 am, 5 hours and 5 minutes late, passed Barnard at 6.51 am, and the open office at Onawa at 7.09 am, 5 hours and 10 minutes late. At 7.14 am, 2.3 miles west of Onawa, it collided head-on with eastbound freight First No. 78. The wooden box baggage car absorbed a good deal of the shock, but 19 passengers were killed in the coach and first colonist car, as well as the engine crews of both trains.
First 78 was made up of engine 2516, 30 loads and 2 empties, and a caboose. It left Megantic at 6 pm the evening before, 30 minutes late. Six cars were set out at Holeb. At the non-telegraph station of Moosehead, it met First and Second 39, as well as Extra 3470 West, which delivered order No. 28, Form 19 to it. Helping orders can be forwarded to non-telegraph stations quite safely this way, on Form 19, since non-delivery would at most result in delay. This order gave First 78 five hours on Third 39, so they had ample time to make Morkill for it. First 78 arrived Greenville at 6.30 am, where fresh copies of orders No. 20 and No. 28 were received. They left Greenville at 6.40 am, and arrived Morkill at 6.57 am, where they took siding.
Dispatcher Shaw noted the progress that First 78 was making. He was interested in getting them to Brownville Junction before they had 16 hours of duty, so promptly gave them time against Fourth 39, in order No. 47: "Third No 39 eng 783 late Fourth No 39 eng unknown run 8 hours late Barnard to Megantic." This order was transmitted to operator Kingdon at Morkill, who repeated it and received complete. When First 78 pulled in, he had it ready and ran out to hand it up to the cab and the caboose. At the caboose, he handed it to engineman Chase, who was deadheading, who in turn gave it to conductor Manuel. Flagman Gardiner read it when it was laid on the caboose table.
Brakeman Austin heard engineman Bagley say to the fireman: "We have eight hours on Third 39." Conductor Manuel and flagman Gardiner had the same opinion, "Eight hours" was heard to be exchanged. Little thinking was going on here. They had just received five hours on Third 39 just half an hour before at Greenville, but did not wonder how it could have lost so much time so quickly. In their eagerness to reach Brownville Junction, First 78 left Morkill, and operator Kingdon OS'ed to Dispatcher Shaw. Both of these men thought that the train might be going to Bodfish for Third 39, but a consideration of the time would have shown the futility of leaving Morkill at 6.57 and having to be clear at Bodfish at 7 am, with the required 5 minutes clearance. Operator Valley, who handled the 8 am - 4 pm trick at Morkill, had arrived on First 78 and thought something was funny, but could not make Kingdon appreciate the situation.
Had this been realized at once, Third 39 could still have been stopped at Onawa, an open office, which it had not yet passed. The chance was lost, and Dispatcher Shaw first realized something was wrong when his phone lines went out of service, as the accident damaged the pole line. The ICC is quite hard on Shaw and Kingdon, but they were not responsible for the accident, though with vigilance they could have prevented it. The true cause of the accident was the mass misreading of order No. 47.
